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COVID-19 continues to wreak havoc – not only by taking the lives of thousands
of people across the world but also by impacting the national and international
economy. The pandemic has disrupted business in all of its manifestations and
caused millions of workers to be laid off.
Many companies, including those owned and run by foreign investors, are subjected
to an unprecedented host of state measures. These unexpected circumstances
have brought international investment law center stage, as legal scholars and
practitioners evaluate the current position of foreign investors and host states. In this
vein, the most critical questions are: Will a state be shielded from its responsibility
resulting from responses to COVID-19 if the emergency measures taken by the
host government are challenged by foreign investors? And more specifically, which
defenses can, and should a host state invoke in response to such claims?
Generally, host states may rely on two grounds to legally defend themselves against
treaty claims regarding the measures in question. The first ground is exemption
provisions of international investment agreements (IIAs). The second possible
ground is defenses under customary international law, especially force majeure and
necessity.
Exemption provisions of International Investment Agreements
Many recently concluded IIAs contain specific exceptions which prevent the host
state from incurring responsibility if the measures contravening the IIA serve the
protection of public health. A notable example can be found in the Australia-Uruguay
Free Trade Agreement (AUFTA) concluded on 5 April 2019, in which Article 15
provides that “nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent a party from
adopting or enforcing measures: (a) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life
or health.”
In the Canada-EU Trade Agreement (CETA), concluded on 30 October 2016,
Article Annex 8-A (3) states that non-discriminatory measures of a party that are
designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as health,
safety and the environment, do not constitute indirect expropriations, except in “rare
circumstances”.
As most implemented measures regarding the pandemic ostensibly serve to protect
public health, these exceptions could help the host state as a defense against treaty
claims. While the CETA provision expressly only protects host states against the
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claim of indirect expropriation, the provisions of AUFTA could be relied on more
broadly. However, a closer reading also reveals differences. Notably, AUFTA limits
the scope of the exception to measures “necessary” to protect human health.
This seems to open the door to a case-by-case analysis of tribunals, which have
in the past opted for different standards of review in light of such public purpose
exceptions. Yet generally, the measures taken to tackle the pandemic seem to fall
squarely within the ambit of the exceptions.
However, not all investment treaties contain such exceptions. Accordingly, the
pandemic may also serve as a catalyst for some countries, especially developing
ones, which have faced many investment claims in the past to reconsider the reform
of their IIAs so as to include exceptions that equip the governments to effectively
deal with future challenges.
Yet, even in the absence of exceptions provisions in the IIAs, a host state may
invoke customary international law defenses to itself defend against treaty claims.
Host state defenses under customary international law 
According to the International Law Commission (ILC)’s articles on state
responsibility, there is a list of six defenses precluding the wrongfulness of an act
of a state. These include consent, self-defense, countermeasures, force majeure,
distress, and necessity. Two of these mentioned defenses are particularly relevant to
the host state measures in response to COVID-19, namely: (1) force majeure and (2)
necessity.
a. Force majeure
Force majeure is defined in Art. 23 (1) ILC Articles as the occurrence of an
irresistible force or an unforeseen event, beyond the control of the state, making
it materially impossible to perform the obligation. In Autopista v. Venezuela, the
ICSID tribunal further contoured force majeure and held that there are only three
conditions that must be met for a host state to rely on force majeure defense: (1)
impossibility, (2) unforeseeability, and (3) non-attributability. Generally, the standard
to accept force majeure is very strict, and respondent states have frequently failed to
substantiate these requirements before investment tribunals.
The spread of COVID-19 likely amounts to an unforeseen event, but host states
will probably struggle to prove that the pandemic made the performance of its IIA
obligations not only difficult but impossible. In any event, an arbitral tribunal would
need to carry out an in-depth analysis of of the specific circumstances in a given host
state in light of the force majeure requirements before excusing the state from its
obligations.
b. Necessity
A host state may also rely on the necessity doctrine to avoid its international
obligations, including duties owed with regards to foreign investors. According to Art.
25 (1) ILC Articles, to successfully invoke the necessity defense, the host state must
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prove that (1) the state’s act was sought to protect its essential interest; (2) the state
faces a grave and imminent peril; (3) the act in question is the only way for the state
to protect that essential interest; and that (4) the act does not seriously impair the
vital interests of another state or the international community. A host state, however,
cannot rely on the necessity defense to avoid a wrongful act if (1) the obligation in
question arises out of a peremptory norm of international law; (2) invoking necessity
for the commitment in question is precluded by an international agreement which the
state is a party to; or (3) the state concerned has contributed to the state of necessity
it finds itself in.
Given the publicly available information pertinent to COVID-19, it seems that the
outbreak of the virus meets the requirements to invoke the necessity of the state
defense. The staggering number of deaths due to COVID-19 indicates that the
disease poses a grave and imminent peril to people around the world. It, therefore,
threatens an essential interest of any country and the international community. The
COVID-19 pandemic has also been an unprecedented event; therefore, states’
interventions in response to the epidemic appear inevitable to protect their essential
interest. Furthermore, at the time of writing, no cure or immunization has been
developed for COVID-19, and states have taken measures from social-distancing
to shutdowns as the only feasible way to slow the spread of the pandemic, as
recommended by the WHO. Arbitral tribunals will still analyze and examine all the
measures that host states have adopted in response to the epidemic. If a tribunal
finds that other lawful ways had existed for states to address the threat, regardless
of whether these ways are expensive or inconvenient, the plea will likely fail (Suez v.
Argentina, and Enron v. Argentina).
This in turn, might render it difficult for some countries to plead the necessity defense
in response to the emergency measures taken to combat COVID-19. For instance,
developing countries with poorly funded healthcare systems could be barred from
relying on the necessity defense, if the feebleness of the healthcare system is
considered a significant contributing element. In Impregilo v. Argentina, the tribunal
held that “a state’s contribution to its necessity situation need not be specifically
intended or planned – it can be the consequence, inter alia, of well-intended but ill-
conceived policies.” However, other arbitral tribunals adopted a narrower approach
in interpreting the non-contribution requirement. In Urbaser v. Argentina,  the tribunal
provided that the government’s acts should have been directed towards a crisis
resulting in the emergency, or at least of such nature that the Government must
have known that such a crisis must have been the outcome of its acts. Under this
standard, it seems more likely, that tribunals would not consider weak healthcare
systems a contributing element in itself.
In short, the requirements to accept a state of necessity due to the pandemic
seem likely to be fulfilled. However, because the necessity plea under customary
international law standard is stringent and difficult to satisfy, a case-by-case analysis
by tribunals will be needed before excusing it from its obligation based on the
necessity doctrine.
Coda
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The COVID-19 pandemic is a grave threat to the vital interests of states. It affects
not only the health of individuals all over the world but also whole economies,
including foreign investments. COVID-19 continues to spread rapidly in many
parts of the world, and governmental measures are essential to respond to the
unprecedented health crisis it poses. In these circumstances, foreign investors will
likely suffer substantial losses, which may lead them to claim a breach of their rights
under IIAs by means of arbitration. Host states may defend themselves against
investment claims by relying on treaty exceptions or defenses under customary
international law, particularly force majeure, and the necessity defense. One of
the lessons to be learned from this current crisis is that a reform of IIAs to include
exception provisions that allow host states to effectively protect their population’s
health in times of crises should be an essential objective, especially for developing
states.
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